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OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE: THE
ELEPHANT IN THE LABOR MARKET
CHARLES WHEELAN
Good morning and thank you for having me. This symposium
addresses something that I consider to be a very important labor force issue.
Let me begin with a question: How many of you got up this morning and
told your friends or significant others that you were attending a symposium
to discuss burning issues related to social justice? How many of you said
you were going to a symposium to discuss fundamental issues at the core of
human liberty that involve the most basic relationship between citizens and
the state?
By now you are probably convinced that you are in the wrong room
because licensing is not usually associated with social justice and the topic
certainly seems more prosaic than something at the core of human liberty.
But I am going to argue that it is both. This is an issue that should exercise
libertarians-people who believe in a minimally intrusive government-
because licensing involves the government telling you what you can and
cannot do for a living. As a consumer, it tells you who you can or cannot
hire to provide a given service.
The State is telling you that without a license you cannot practice
certain professions, which is a very heavy-handed form of regulation. The
State is also telling you that you cannot hire someone if he or she has not
gone through a certain kind of training or passed a particular exam. This
regulation overrides your judgment as an informed consumer. Government
knows better than you do. This should be a "red meat" issue for libertarians
and economic conservatives who believe that smaller government is better.
Licensing is also a social justice issue. If you are someone who cares
passionately about what kinds of jobs low-skilled workers can do in the 21st
century economy, or how ex-offenders can successfully re-enter society
after leaving prison, then you also should care because licensing can often
prevent disadvantaged groups from finding jobs. There are a lot of low-
skilled professions, such as barbers, manicurists, or even hair braiders that
could be done by people with few formal skills. Yet individuals are
precluded by law from entering those professions without certain types of
training that may or may not have a significant impact on their job
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performance.
What I have described to you is an issue that should resonate across the
entire political spectrum-from the economic libertarians who aggressively
question the right of the state to limit your choices, to people who spend a
lot of time thinking about policies that affect our most disadvantaged
citizens.
If we leave the ideological poles aside, there are some pragmatic
reasons to think deeply about the effects of licensing. I teach at a public
policy school. The issues we are most likely to discuss in terms of "broken
systems" are healthcare and education. Healthcare and education turn out to
be two fields with the highest proportion of licensed workers.
Teaching requires a certificate, which is a misnomer, since it is really a
license to teach. With very few exceptions, you cannot teach at any public
school in America without a State-issued license. Healthcare is slightly
different in that it is made up of many different licensed professions.
Doctors are the most obvious, but we have nurses, nurse anesthetists,
respiratory therapists, physician's assistants and so on. Each one of those
professions involves their own specified licensing process.
There are philosophical reasons that you should care about licensing.
There are also pragmatic reasons if you care about some really important
public policy challenges. For something that should really be a red meat
issue for political ideologues and a concern for people who want public
education and healthcare to improve, this is an issue that gets very little
substantive attention and virtually no political traction.
THE ECONOMICS OF LICENSING
I am not unequivocally anti-government. I would describe myself as
politically left-of-center. I think there is an important role for regulation
throughout the economy. There are many ways in which government makes
markets work better or can improve upon market outcomes. Having said
that, I am convinced that licensing has become a form of stealth regulation
that, in many cases, is doing more harm than good. We do not exercise
much analytical rigor in deciding which professions should be licensed and
which should not. At the minimum, I hope by the end of the symposium
you are persuaded that this is an issue that deserves more public attention
than it has been getting.
Let's look from an economic standpoint: when, why, and how should a
profession be licensed? There are three cases in which licensing can
improve overall social welfare. The first is the case in which a profession
poses some potential threat to a third party. An electrician would be a
classic example. If you go out and decide to hire a cheap, unqualified
electrician, his or her poor work is not merely your problem. The poor
wiring in your house could easily end up burning down my house. Tree
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trimming would be another example, even though it might not be
considered a highly skilled profession. If someone goes out and cuts down
a limb only on your property, it is only your problem. But in a lot of cases,
particularly in a dense urban environment, if someone cuts down a tree limb
on your property it can become my problem very quickly. There are cases
where bad service provisions affect society beyond the consumer who has
hired the service provider. This is a classic case of an externality. We can
make society better off by passing regulation that makes that consumer
more likely to act in a way consistent with the rest of our interests.
The second example where a compelling case for licensure exists is
when there is a different kind of externality. The people harmed by a low-
quality service provider are the people who are receiving that service.
However, the fact they received that service poorly affects the rest of us.
Teachers are a good example because they only do harm to the students
they are teaching. However, society cares a lot about whether those
students become literate, good citizens, and so on. A bad teacher in a bad
school is not going to harm me directly as an electrician might. On the other
hand, we in society have a stake in the quality of education that those
students, many of whom we will never meet, receive in the classroom.
Therefore, we can justify imposing some kind of regulation that might raise
the quality of service being provided to other people.
The third case for licensing is more debatable, and that is a situation
where society does not think that you or anybody else is capable of making
a smart choice in terms of a service provider. It is paternalism, because if
they make a bad choice, it does not affect the rest of us in any way. This is
not an electrician or trimmer; it is something like a yoga instructor, a
profession that has been considered for licensure. You choose a bad yoga
instructor and as a result you will be harmed. So we as a society are
imposing our preferences on that person because we have deemed them
incapable of making a smart decision. I describe this as paternalism because
we are overriding a decision that they might otherwise make. In some ways
it is a little like seatbelt laws for adults or motorcycle helmet laws. Clearly,
society in other realms has decided that we want to impose some change in
your behavior.
Let me make two additional observations with regard to the theory of
licensing. First, certification can solve many of the problems that are
traditionally associated with licensing. I will explain the relevant
terminology. Licensing is any case in which the government, usually a state
government, requires that a service provider have a license. That license
usually requires certain prerequisites, whether it is training, passing an
exam, or the like. If you do not have the license, you cannot legally provide
the service.
Certification merely signals that someone has received a certain kind of
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training or has demonstrated a certain expertise, but individuals who are not
certified are still allowed to practice the profession. Any one of us can hire
someone who is certified or we can hire someone who is not certified. For
example, you could have your computer serviced by someone who is
certified by Dell, meaning that person has gone through training programs
that Dell feels qualifies them to do good work. Or, you can have your
computer serviced by your Uncle Al. If the Dell certification has some
value then presumably you are willing to pay more in the marketplace for
someone who is certified than for someone who is not. But it is optional.
I point this out because licensure is sometimes justified on the grounds
that it helps rational consumers help themselves. You might not know
whether a particular optometrist is qualified, therefore licensing is necessary
to solve this information problem. That is a logical fallacy. Certification
could do exactly the same thing in a less coercive way. The state
government could simply set up a series of requirements to become
certified as an optometrist. Imagine that the requirements are exactly the
same as what is currently required by law to become licensed as an
optometrist. Then when it came time to have someone check your eyes, you
could choose someone certified by the state, and all the information about
quality represented by that certification, or you could choose to go to
someone else. Certification, even though it is voluntary, can provide any
essential information to the consumer. The key is what economists refer to
as an information asymmetry, meaning that service providers know more
about the quality of service than consumers do. This is not a traditional
economic rationale for licensure. A well designed certification program can
provide whatever information consumers may need, assuming that they are
rational decision makers.
Finally, for licensure to work in terms of improving overall quality in
the profession, it has to actually improve the quality of service provided in
the profession. It is true that a bad tree trimmer can cut down my neighbor's
tree in a way in which the branch falls and crushes my roof. That argues in
favor of some kind of regulation. However, the regulation put in place must
actually make it less likely that the tree trimmer will cut down a limb in a
way that crushes my roof. If we do something that does not truly improve
quality in the profession, then we have not achieved our social objective,
even if there is a compelling reason for people in this profession to be
licensed. The fact that you might do harm to a third party is necessary but
not sufficient to justify regulation. The regulation must also achieve its
intended effect with regard to quality in order to improve overall social
welfare.
That is a brief overview of the theory as to when we should license
professions and when we should not. As you should recognize, there is
nothing about the theory that says licensing is inherently bad. But like any
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tool, it can be abused.
POSSIBLE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF LICENSING
Licensing can also be a bad thing. It has legitimate economic purposes
that can be used in a way that diminishes overall social welfare. How can
regulation that ostensibly upgrades the quality of services provided end up
making society worse off? There are a number of ways in which that might
happen.
It is entirely possible within a profession to have "too much" quality.
This might seem silly. More quality is presumably always better. In fact,
that is not the case. Higher quality usually requires higher cost. Some
consumers may prefer less quality at a lower cost. This point is best
illustrated by an exchange that supposedly happened between Milton
Friedman and a lawyer who was a member of the American Bar
Association. Milton Friedman was a prominent opponent of licensing. He
wrote his dissertation at the University of Chicago on the costs of overly
restrictive licensing in the healthcare industry. Supposedly, Friedman had
made the pitch to a group of lawyers that it should be much easier to
practice law. One of the members of the Bar Association took issue with
this position and asserted that all lawyers should be "Cadillacs." Friedman
retorted that if all lawyers are Cadillacs, many consumers will not be able to
afford any vehicle at all.
Sometimes a Corolla is just fine. If the only choice for consumers is
between a Cadillac and nothing, you may be unable to afford the Cadillac,
in which case you get nothing. Using law as an example, there are a whole
host of circumstances in which a "Corolla lawyer" may be fine. There are
plenty of legal tasks that are important but not that sophisticated: drawing
up a will for a simple estate, a simple divorce or bankruptcy, and so on.
There is no reason you need someone who has graduated from Yale or
clerked for the Supreme Court to carry out these tasks. Yet if you set the
licensing bar too high, consumers are deprived of a more affordable choice,
in which case they may not get the will or the bankruptcy assistance. If that
is the case, then there is a social cost.
Let's look at medicine as another example. If someone is going to do
brain surgery you would like them to be as highly skilled as possible.
However, most of medicine is not brain surgery. If you have children, you
know that much of medicine is about stuffy noses, ear infections, basic
immunizations, and flu shots. There are many relatively mundane but
extremely important tasks that can be done well by nurses, physician's
assistants, or specially trained public health professionals. If you make it
illegal for those individuals to do basic things like prenatal care or give
immunizations, then it is less affordable to obtain that important medical
care. Therefore, it is less likely they receive it, in which case the public
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health costs can be quite significant.
Licensing may not improve quality. We should not assume that
because we put a licensing law in place that we are upgrading overall
quality in the profession. Nor can we assume that it will remove the worst
service providers in the profession. There is an assumption that if a
profession can harm the public then it ought to be licensed. I would concede
that point. However, there is not sufficient skepticism as to whether the law
subsequently put in place, passing an exam, or taking certain classes,
actually improves quality.
Let me give you a powerful example. Beginning around the year 2000,
Los Angeles was forced to hire thousands of new teachers as the result of a
California law putting a cap on the student/teacher ratio. Los Angeles had to
hire so many new teachers that the district was unable to fill all the
positions with certified teachers. As a result, the district hired thousands of
individuals who were either in the process of becoming certified or not
certified at all.
There was a unique opportunity to observe the counterfactual. It is
usually hard to compare the performance of certified teachers to non-
certified teachers because uncertified teachers cannot legally practice in the
classroom. Los Angeles is also unique in that the district collected
classroom level data on student performance for many years so that it was
possible to observe the impact of a particular teacher. Therefore, we can
look at the students assigned to a particular teacher and determine their
achievement gains over the course of the year. Then the next year the
teacher will have a new group of students and we can do the same thing.
Over time, it becomes possible to distinguish the most effective teachers
from the least effective.
The Los Angeles experience was studied by several economists and
they came to two very powerful conclusions.' First, good teachers matter
enormously. If you are fortunate enough to have a good teacher several
years in a row, your progress is dramatically better than students with
average or below average teachers. Conversely, if you have a poor teacher
for several years in a row, you will lose significant traction relative to other
students.
Second, there was no statistically significant relationship between
teacher certification and performance in the classroom. In other words,
teacher quality matters, but what we demand of our teachers in order to
become licensed has no discernible impact on that quality. Other research
has come to similar conclusions with regard to licensure for other
1. ROBERT GORDON, THOMAS J. KANE, & DOUGLAS 0. STAIGER, Identifying Effective
Teachers Using Performance on the Job, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2006-01, April
2006.
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professions. Just because quality in a profession matters does not mean that
we can necessarily assume that the licensure requirements stipulated by a
state legislature or licensing board will improve that quality.
Licensure can actually diminish the quality of professional training. To
make this point, let me contrast journalism school, which is obviously not
required by law, with teacher certification programs, which are provided by
schools of education and are required in all states in order to become a
public school teacher.
Journalism schools must add value for those who attend them or else
they would disappear. Presumably, either journalism employers pay a
premium for employees with journalism degrees, or it is easier to break into
the profession. If that were not the case, then students would not pay to
attend journalism school. There has to be some market-based reason for a
person to seek out this kind of training. Therefore, journalism schools must
constantly think about the skills that students need and employers demand
in order to survive. There is a market mechanism forcing the training to be
relevant and valuable. If this market mechanism breaks down, then people
will cease to attend journalism school, and the schools will close down.
Education schools are the opposite in that you must go to an education
school and take the prescribed courses because the law says that you have
to. If you do not take those courses in those programs, you cannot become a
teacher. Therefore, the courses themselves do not have to make you a better
teacher. Their value lies in the fact that you cannot get a job without taking
them. As a result, there is much less of a market mechanism forcing an
improvement in the quality of those programs. Schools that are hiring
teachers may still prefer the graduates that come out of one program as
opposed to another, but to the extent you have come out of any program
you are at least allowed to get a job. The fact that there is not much pressure
to prove these programs produce great educators is consistent with the data
from Los Angeles, where teacher licensing seems to have no significant
effect on classroom quality.
Licensing restricts mobility, both within and across professions.
Licensure laws are generally passed at the state level. As a result, someone
who is licensed in Ohio may find it difficult to move to Wisconsin, even
though he or she has worked successfully in Ohio for 20 years. States often
have reciprocity laws for licensure, but not always.
Licensing can also reduce mobility across job descriptions. Someone
who is licensed to teach high school may not be able to move to elementary
school or even to middle school. The law may preclude a person who is a
very good eighth grade teacher from moving to ninth grade, which is
potentially ridiculous.
One less obvious effect on mobility is that licensure can prevent
professionals from doing tasks that are the exclusive legal province of
No. 2] Occupational Licensing: The Elephant in the Labor Market 23
another licensed profession. For example, a registered nurse may not be
able to do certain tasks that are reserved for respiratory therapists in states
that license respiratory therapists. The result is vertical silos in a field like
healthcare which has a substantial number of licensed professions each with
legally prescribed responsibilities. Hospitals and other healthcare providers
have less flexibility in staffing. Healthcare workers have less mobility in
the field, even across jobs that are broadly similar.
As I mentioned at the outset, licensing can prevent some individuals
from entering the labor force at all, particularly in low-skilled professions
that pose little harm to the public, such as cutting hair or grooming pets.
Licensing can keep individuals out of the labor force. It can prevent
workers from moving across state lines to pursue opportunities. It can also
prevent workers from moving to similar jobs within the same basic
profession.
Licensing can lower quality in a profession by creating barriers to entry
that are most costly for individuals with the highest opportunity cost of
time. This is arguably the least intuitive of all the potential adverse
outcomes but one that is important to appreciate. You may assume that,
worst case, if the requirements for licensure are completely useless then
society is no worse off than if we did not have any licensing requirements at
all. A law that has no effect on quality should not be any different than
having no law at all. That is wrong. Any kind of training has some
opportunity cost. If you are required to take two years of classes that tum
out to be useless, you could have been doing something else with those two
years. The time and the money obviously have value. It is also true that the
most highly-skilled individuals in our society are the ones who have the
highest opportunity cost of time. They are the most likely to be deterred by
some kind of required training that is expensive in terms of time.
Think again about teaching. Suppose that we require two years of
training that does not turn out to have much value in the classroom. That
makes it significantly less likely that someone who is now a physicist at a
federal laboratory or a chemist for Abbott is going to leave that job to teach
because it would require two years of training. If that training has no value,
it is particularly expensive to society if it keeps people who would
otherwise be very good teachers out of the classroom. When you think
about this subject, just remember that when Albert Einstein retired to
Princeton, New Jersey, he was precluded by law from teaching high school
physics unless he went back to school for eighteen months or two years to
get a teaching license.
How DOES THIS HAPPEN?
How do we get licensing laws that do not necessarily make sense? We
know there is a potential role for licensing, but we are seeing a lot of laws
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that are not making us better off. On the face of it, licensing hair braiders
just does not make a lot of sense.
Here, basic political economy can give us some intellectual traction.
The reason that we see more licensing laws than is probably socially
optimal is that there is a huge financial incentive for professions themselves
to seek licensure. If you are a teacher, an optometrist, or a hair braider and
you would like to raise your income, there are a number of ways you could
go about doing it. One is working harder or more productively. Another
would be to go to your state legislature and say, "Could you send us
money?" On the other hand, you could go to the same state legislature and
say, "Could you make it harder for potential competitors to enter my
business?" You would not exactly describe it that way; you would talk
about the importance of training and competency and so on. The end result
would be to make it more difficult and/or costly to enter the profession.
At the same time, you would almost certainly ask the state legislature to
exempt all current service providers from those new licensing requirements
or "grandfather" them. So all new entrants to the profession have to take
classes, pass an exam, and do an internship. However, if I am already
practicing the profession at the time the law is passed, I am exempt. This
will have same practical effect as the legislature sending me a check. By
restricting the entry of new service providers, we can raise the incomes of
those already in the profession. If supply goes down relative to what it
would have been, then price goes up. In this case, the price is the wage of
practitioners in the newly-licensed profession.
Consequently, no one speaks for consumers who now pay more. Many
service providers do work for consumers who are not organized around this
issue. Barbers have a professional association to look after their legislative
interests, but people who go to barbers do not. When licensing legislation
comes up in a general assembly, the profession involved usually has some
kind of organized interest acting on their behalf. They often have a lobbyist
tracking and promoting licensing legislation. Meanwhile, consumers do not
pay a whole lot of attention. How many of you have ever gone to your state
capital or called your state representative to say, "I am uncomfortable with
hair braiders being licensed because it is going to raise the cost the next
time I get my hair braided"?
It is perfectly rational for a profession that is seeking licensure to invest
a lot of time and money in that process. Since the costs of licensure are
generally diffused over a large group of busy, unorganized consumers, it is
perfectly rational that none of us shows up in the state capital to question
whether or not yoga instructors ought to be licensed. For the typical
legislator, he or she can pick up the support of the barbers association, the
teachers union, or the Bar Association by creating more rigorous licensing
legislation. They will not pay a cost in terms of political capital with the rest
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of us because we are not paying attention. Of course, that explains the
explosion of licensing laws in recent decades; it does not justify them.
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Let me conclude by talking about how we can make all of this better.
We would like to pass a licensing law when: 1) there is a profession that
poses some potential harm to the public, and 2) the law changes the entry
criteria or training requirements for the profession in some way that
successfully ameliorates the harm.
Having thought about this a great deal, I have composed what I would
describe as my checklist for legislators and policy types.
The first and most important thing is to ask what the goal is. Next, seek
the least costly means of achieving that goal. What are we trying to
accomplish? For example, in the context of teaching, is it to simply weed
out potentially dangerous teachers? If that is the case, then it can be
accomplished with something far less costly and time-intensive than
traditional licensure, such as a national criminal background check. There
are teachers who have done horrible things to students; they should not be
teaching.
Keeping a national database and checking names against it is a
relatively cheap and quick way to accomplish that objective. For people
with no prior criminal activity, it imposes virtually no cost. This does not
keep the scientist from Abbott out of the classroom, where we need more
science teachers.
We must always ask, "Will certification work instead?" If we are
concerned that consumers cannot tell which service providers are of high
quality and which are of low quality, but we trust them to make a sensible
decision when they have such information, then we do not need to license
the profession.
I cannot tell a competent eye doctor from an incompetent eye doctor.
That does not mean that we need to license eye doctors. Instead, the State
could stipulate what training produces qualified eye doctors. Everybody
who does that training, or passes a certain exam, will be certified as
competent by the State. I am still free to see whatever eye doctor I choose.
If you visit a certified eye doctor, then you get exactly what you would get
if that were a licensed profession. The state has helped you overcome a
potential information barrier. On the other hand, if for some reason you
want to go to an uncertified eye doctor, go for it! If you want to save
money, or if you know enough about eye doctors that you can discern
quality on your own, then you still have that right.
When providing information to consumers is the rationale for the state
to inject itself into the labor market, we should always explore certification
as a less coercive but still potentially effective option.
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We should ask whether a licensing law will achieve what it is supposed
to do. Will it actually improve the quality of service provided? Does it
actually reduce the chance that someone will cut down a tree and crush my
roof? To the extent that the whole point of this type of legislation is to
improve the quality of some profession or to eliminate those who are really
dangerous, there should be evidence that whatever is being required by law
is likely to have that effect. Does this exam or training actually lead to
better performance on the job? As you saw with teacher certification, this is
not necessarily the case.
The burden of proof should be placed on the parties seeking licensure to
demonstrate that it will make the public better off. When this idea reaches
the legislature, someone is going to point out that members of the
profession are in a position to do harm. That is step one. That is the
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for licensure. Step two is to provide
compelling evidence that what we are requiring of potential entrants to the
profession will solve the problem that has been identified. If that answer is
no, or even uncertain, then the State should not pass this law. You have
identified something as dangerous but you have not ameliorated the danger.
A legislature should not exempt current service providers from new
licensing requirements. For example, if there is an exam that is required to
become a hair braider, then all hair braiders, old and new, need to pass the
exam. If we say that someone who has been doing this for ten years must
already be experienced and competent, that is fine. We can write that into
the law. Therefore, anybody who has been doing it for 10 years in another
state or country ought to be exempt from the exam as well.
Whatever is required of new entrants to the profession should be
required of those who are already in the profession because this will
ostensibly protect the public. This serves two purposes. First, if this
requirement is really effective in protecting the public from low quality or
dangerous service providers, then it will remove those people from the
current workforce, which is presumably a good thing.
Second, it will remove the political impetus for groups to seek licensure
merely to enhance their own economic interests by creating barriers to
entry. Groups in a profession can no longer make it hard and costly for new
entrants to the profession while exempting themselves from those same
hard and expensive requirements. Therefore, a professional association has
much less incentive to go to St. Paul or Madison to lobby for more rigorous
licensing standards if they are imposing those costs on themselves.
Finally, any enlightened legislator ought to examine the licensure laws
on the books and consider rolling many of them back. We ought to change
the burden of proof. If there is no evidence that a current law leads to better
outcomes, then there is a compelling reason to repeal it. We should not just
assume that licensure is a good thing when I have provided many reasons
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why it might generate social costs far in excess of the benefits.
I hope that I have persuaded you this is a really important topic. It may
not be terribly sexy. I am sure we would have more people here today if we
were talking about pornography and the First Amendment, but in terms of
regulations that impact our everyday lives, you would be hard-pressed to
find a more significant topic. Licensing has a profound impact on who
enters what professions and on how entire industries operate. We need to be
much more cognizant of the potential distortions that overzealous licensing
can impose on our economy.
